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The anatomy of the British
economic "elite"
Mike Savage, Katharina Hecht, ]ohs. Hjellbrekke,
Niall Cunningham and Daniel Laurison

Images of the British elite saturate iconic symbolism of upper classes across
the globe. The aristocratic stately home has been safeguarded and show
cased by Britain's largest charity, the National Trust, and served up for
global audiences by media productions such as Downton Abbey. British public
schools, and the quadrangles of Oxford and Cambridge, define a particu
lar vision of wealthy aristocratic turned "meritocratic" excellence. However,
it is uncertain whether these symbols still effectively grasp the nature of
Britain's contemporary elites, given unusually rapid economic and social
change from the 1970s. Comprehensive de-industrialization from the 1950s
and the subsequent restructuring of the UK as a global financial centre
from the 1980s have left a profound legacy. Research by economists has
demonstrated that the UK has a distinctive trajectory, having moved from
being a relatively egalitarian nation in the 1970s to being one of the rriost
unequal in Europe by the early twenty-first century. Britain's Cini coeffi
cient (the most commonly used metric to measure income inequality) rose
starkly during the 1980s, before flattening in the 2000s, but at 0.33 it remains
higher than any other major European nation with the possible exception
of Spain (Eurofund 2017). Much of the increase in overall inequality is due
to developments at the top of the distribution, specifically the increasing
share of the top 1 percent of highest earners (Morelli et al. 2015). In the
UK, the share of the top 1 percent in total income almost doubled between
1970 and 2012 from 7 percent to 13 percent, having peaked in 2009 when
the share was 15 percent Uenkins 2016; Jenkins and Alvaredo 2016).
It has been argued that while the share of the top 1 percent in terms of
income has increased dramatically, the role of traditional wealth holders notably landowners - has significantly faded. And indeed, Atkinson (2015)
demonstrates that ownership of wealth changed dramatically over the past
century; it is now much more equally distributed than it was in the Victorian
era. Nineteenth-century economists assumed that there were three social
classes: workers, capitalists and landlords, who derived income from labour,
profits and rents respectively (Atkinson 2015). In contemporary Britain,
these distinctions are no longer so clear-cut, because a person may receive
income from all three sources; wealth is shared more widely and those

with the highest incomes from labour increasingly also have high capital
incomes. 1 In addition, "top earners have caught up with, or overtaken those
living off capital income" (Atkinson 2015: 107). Research by economists
therefore points towards a change away from an aristocratic or capitalist
rentier "elite" to a "meritocratic" financialized "elite" of individuals with top
incomes, including hedge fund managers, chief executive officers (CEOs)
and footballers (see Littler 2013; Atkinson 2015).
Our aim here is to provide a sociological analysis to consider how far the
British economic "elite" has moved on from land-owning aristocrats who
derived income from rents (and were hence free to spend their time pursu
ing cultural interests) to a global financial elite who derive income from
labour and capital (and can therefore legitimize their advantage in "meri
tocratic" market terms). Indeed, the argument that a new kind of finan
cial elite has eclipsed the traditional British upper class is commonly made.
This argument can take nationalist overtones, as with the social commenta
tor Peter York (2015), quoted and interpreted, by the Daily Mail as saying:
i'An extraordinary mixture of Russian oligarchs, Middle Easterners,
new petrodollar types from Nigeria, Indians, Malaysians and, latterly,
Chinese . .. [are] driving up the prices of London property and driving
all but the richest, the most adaptable Sloanes [i.e. 1980s-style British
upper class] further south and north - and some out of London alto
gether." He says the next generation of Sloane Rangers is now likely to
be working as effective "butlers" for the rich foreigners, selling them
houses, yachts or investment opportunities. The trend is being exac
erbated by the fact that private education is now being bought up by
wealthy foreigners, with students sent from China, Russia and the Mid
dle East pricing the children of British professionals out of top schools.
(Daily Mail Online 2015)
York's comment is tinged by a certain nationalistic undertone, but points
to a crucial research question: how far has the traditional British economic
elite, who historically were the most prosperous groups in the population,
the top capital income earners, now been eclipsed by a global financial elite,
"parked" in London? To what extent can we still detect amongst today's top
earners distinctive British upper-class motifs? We address this question here
by asking if the super-rich have distinctive cultural and social attributes,
and if they have, how far they might deviate from the traditional and "high
brow" forms which are characteristic of older upper-class formation.
Lurking behind this question is the need to consider whether contem
porary elite culture remains exclusive and perpetuates traditional upper
class snobbery. In their study of British elite cultural practices drawn from
a small qualitative sample of a highly exclusive managerial elite, Warde and
Bennett (2008: 258) argue that these older forms of upper-class exclusion
are no longer evident:
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Culture produces affinities within the group without necessarily or
intentionally excluding others. Nothing in our evidence suggests that
their attachment to a dominant culture is an attempt to exercise social
control over subordinate classes. Neither does our managerial elite
seem to be engaging in activities which are exclusive to people in their
very elevated social stratum. Their pursuits are neither rare nor arcane.
They are ones shared, though probably less intensively, by other sec
tions of the middle class. Nor does our evidence indicate the use of
culture to mark divisions within the elite.
Our research question therefore poses major issues regarding the extent
to which top-end economic inequality translates into wider forms of social
and cultural closure.
This issue is challenging to address. Despite this huge symbolic freight
of British elites, they are notoriously hard to research, especially when we
probe their symbolic and cultural aspects. This partly reflects the historical
culture of secrecy which the British upper class has long exhibited (Vincent
1998; Savage 2010). Whilst famous for their ostentatious aristocratic display,
the British upper class has been historically closed to outsiders. In a similar
vein, contemporary financial elites are also notoriously elusive, especially
at the extreme top end of the wealth and income distribution. A telling
example is the degree to which the super-prime London property market
is dominated by faceless companies which anonymize and protect wealthy
buyers (see generally Dorling 2014). And this is on top of the usual chal
lenge that researching elites is hard simply because they are by definition
rare, and therefore unlikely to be found in significant numbers in nation
ally representative surveys.
Our chapter provides the most comprehensive account of these high
earners and their partners, drawing on the unusual resources of the Great
British Class Survey (GBCS), which has the largest sample of the very rich
of any British data source ( Savage and Devine 2015). Our aim is to explore
the cultural and social features of the British rich to examine what kinds of
elites they are. We assess whether the super-rich are primarily the cultural
descendants of the traditional British upper classes, or whether they are a
distinctively new formation. We thus describe the contours of the highest
earning households in the UK, and the extent to which they differ from
the rest of the population, from the next-richest, and among themselves to
assess how different they are from the "merely" very well-off.
We firstly explain the problems with data which beset studies of the Brit
ish super-rich, before turning in Section 2 to scoping out the relevance
of the GBCS for studying the wealthy, by contrasting it with the largest
nationally representative sample survey, "Understanding Society" (USoc).
Although the GBCS is not a representative survey and therefore cannot
be used to describe the profiles of high-income earners, we show that by
comparing responses between the very high-income earners and the rest,
revealing differences can be detected. Having shown that the GBCS offers
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the most effective platform for the wider social and cultural analysis of high
income earners that we currently possess, Section 3 shows the geographical
distribution of the very wealthy to underscore their highly particular pre
dilection for West London. The fourth section uses a multiple correspon
dence analysis (MCA) to examine a cleavage between more "established"
and "emerging" elements within the super-high-income earners.

1 Researching the British elite
There continue to be striking data problems which make researching the
British elite very hard. Unlike the situation in Scandinavian nations, there
are no registration data to draw upon. Although numerous nations have
allowed administrative data (especially derived from tax records) to be used
to analyse micro-patterns of mobility and inequality (e.g. Mitnik and Grusky
2015 and Chetty et al. 2014a, 2014b on the US), only aggregate data has
been made available in the UK. The great tradition of social surveys in the
UK has tended to focus on the "bottom end," and have rarely extended
towards elites. Nationally representative sample surveys are not large
enough to include significant numbers of the very rich, and in any event
such surveys have been shown to systematically underrepresent this group
(Piketty 2014;Jenkins 2016; Anand and Segal 2015). Partly because of the
high degree of granularity of UK postcodes, geo-demographic analyses can
be conducted at a small-scale level, and have been heralded by Burrows and
Webber (2016) as offering unusual potential for analysing super-rich neigh
bourhoods. However, the categories deployed are necessarily those derived
from market research classifications, and the data is largely consumption
based. Furthermore, after the early interest in elite case studies conducted
in the 1950s (e.g. Kelsall 2013 on the civil service; Morgan 1969 on bishops,
Otley 1970, 1973 on army officers), the tradition of elite occupational case
studies has largely died away. Indeed, even analyses of corporate interlocks,
whichJohn Scott pioneered in the UK from the 1970s ( e.g. Scott 1997), has
largely fallen into abeyance. It is not for nothing that Savage and Williams
(2008) noted that the elites were "remembered by capitalism, forgotten by
social science" - though this is an unusually British phenomenon given the
rising significance of elite analysis in other nations as demonstrated by the
chapters in this book.
In this chapter we redress this neglect by drawing on the remarkable
resources of the Great British Class Survey (GBCS) to offer an unprece
dented glimpse of those with very high household incomes in the UK. The
GBCS was a web survey hosted by BBC's Lab UK betweenJanuary 2011 and
June 2013, during which period it gathered 325,172 responses. The GBCS,
alongside the smaller nationally representative survey which was conducted
at the same time, has been extensively used by a team principally at LSE,
Manchester and York to develop a new approach to social class in the UK
(Savage et al. 2013, 2015b). The GBCS itself remains a controversial source.
It is highly skewed towards the well-educated and well-off (alongside
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unknown biases probably equating to its BBC affiliation), and therefore
cannot be used to infer nationally representative patterns. For some critics
(e.g. Mil�s 2014), this undermines any scientific value that the GBCS might
have. Savage (2015b) have insisted on the pragmatic value of the GBCS for certain purposes the very large size of the sample allows unusual and
original granular analyses to be conducted which are not possible using
other surveys, and if care is paid to recognizing these sampling biases, then
meaningful inferences can still be drawn. In fact, the general sample bias
towards the upper and middle classes make it a data source of unusual
potential for researching elite formation (see in general, Savage 2015b).
Let us excavate this point further. For whilst there is a general skew in
the GBCS towards the well-educated and better off, there are also some
highly specific micro-skews. Wakeling and Savage (2015) thus compared
the proportion of GBCS respondents who graduated from different univer
sities with the actual size of university student bodies to detect if there were
micro-biases at work (favouring graduates of particular universities, for
instance), over and above a general skew towards large numbers of gradu
ates. Here, they found a strong "elite bias" effect - that the most elite uni
versities, notably Oxford and Cambridge, had more responses than would
be expected given their share of the UK student body, and that this effect
was fairly consistent: as the prestige of universities fell, so did their GBCS
response rates. This is a reasonably reassuring indication that the GBCS
sample skews are consistently biased towards elites.
There is a related issue as to whether specific occupations are more over
represented than others, even within the ranks of the generally privileged
occupations. Appendix 1 looks at the proportion of specific occupations
within NS-SECl (National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification, Class 1)
within the GBCS, compared to the nationally representative Labour Force
Survey (LFS). Forty-seven occupations fall within the range of 0.5 to 2.0 (i.e.
the GBCS proportion is between half and double that of the LFS propor
tion, which we can treat as reasonably nationally representative). There are
some striking outliers, with CEOs being the most remarkable. These form
9 percent of the entire GBCS NS-SECl , compared to 1 percent for the LFS,
entailing a nine-fold overrepresentation within the GBCS. Scientists and
"experts" are also overrepresented in the GBCS, whilst public-sector man
agers are strikingly underrepresented.
Do these micro-skews matter for the interpretation of the data? Clearly,
it makes it difficult to infer the kinds of occupations, or graduates of spe
cific universities, who might make up the high earners, as the proportions
indicated may be due to the over- or underrepresentation of specific occu
pations within the GBCS. However, this sample skew is less likely to be an
issue when the focus is on the relationship between high earners in general
and the less well paid, as relativities between different groups appear to be
robust and have· been replicated in national sample surveys. The findings
of Friedman et al. (2015) and Lamison and Friedman (2016) on the "class
ceiling" demonstrate this. Taking advantage of the unusually large sample
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size of GBCS respondents in NS-SECl , Friedman et al. were able to show
that those respondents from working-class backgrounds tended to be less
well paid than those from more privileged social origins - and hence there
was a "class ceiling" even within specific elite occupations. When Lamison
ani;l Friedman replicated the research design on the nationally representa
tive Labour Force Survey they found very similar results.
It is in this spirit that analyses of the GBCS have proceeded to tease out
telling "elite effects."2 Wakeling and Savage show that Oxford University
conveys the most economic advantages over its other "elite" rivals, and a
smaller "Golden Triangle" group of universities convey advantages over and
above those of their "Russell Group" peers (Wakeling and Savage 2015).
Similarly, Cunningham and Savage (2015, 2017) have used GBCS data to
map the geography of privileged social groups demonstrating a very strik
ing micro-geography within London and the South East. Savage (2015b)
pull together these findings to argue that the contemporary British elite,
with the highest volumes of cultural, social, and economic capital, is very
different from the traditional upper-class model: rather than being an
inheritor of the gentlemanly professional class or ladylike manners, it is
the product of powerful global corporate and financial interests based in
London and the South East of England. This chapter is however the first to
focus specifically on the highest-income earners and their partners/adult
family members within the GBCS.

2 Scoping out households with top incomes: comparing
the Great British Class Survey high earners with
"Understanding Society"
The question asked in the GBCS, from which we derive our sample, is "What
is the annual income of your entire household after taxes?" In this chapter
we select the most economically advantaged group in the survey - those who
report a household income after tax and deductions of £200,000 a year or
more.3 No fewer than 8,044 GBCS respondents fall into t:his £200k+ group.
On inspection, we can see that a significant minority of these respondents
are students or school pupils, who are presumably reporting their paren
tal household income. For such households there is a particular danger
that the reporting of household income could be mistaken. In addition we
only have limited information on the social composition of their parents,
making it difficult to use this information analytically compared to other
respondents. We therefore omit those aged under 22 who reported being
in households earning over £200k as it is likely that they are also reporting,
possibly erroneously, parental income. We also omit non-UK-based partici
pants. This leaves 4,521 cases with household income after taxes of £200k+
available for analysis.
The three highest-income brackets of the GBCS (i.e. £100-149k, 150199k and £200k plus) approximately represent the top 1 percent in house
hold income in the UK (or the two highest depending on household
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inheritor of the gentlemanly professional class or ladylike manners, it is
the product of powerful global corporate and financial interests based in
London and the South East of England. This chapter is however the first to
focus specifically on the highest-income earners and their partners/adult
family members within the GBCS.

2 Scoping out households with top incomes: comparing
the Great British Class Survey high earners with
"Understanding Society"
The question asked in the GBCS, from which we derive our sample, is "What
is the annual income of your entire household after taxes?" In this chapter
we select the most economically advantaged group in the survey - those who
report a household income after tax and deductions of £200,000 a year or
more.3 No fewer than 8,044 GBCS respondents fall into t:his £200k+ group.
On inspection, we can see that a significant minority of these respondents
are students or school pupils, who are presumably reporting their paren
tal household income. For such households there is a particular danger
that the reporting of household income could be mistaken. In addition we
only have limited information on the social composition of their parents,
making it difficult to use this information analytically compared to other
respondents. We therefore omit those aged under 22 who reported being
in households earning over £200k as it is likely that they are also reporting,
possibly erroneously, parental income. We also omit non-UK-based partici
pants. This leaves 4,521 cases with household income after taxes of £200k+
available for analysis.
The three highest-income brackets of the GBCS (i.e. £100-149k, 150199k and £200k plus) approximately represent the top 1 percent in house
hold income in the UK (or the two highest depending on household

156 "Mihe Savage et al.
composition).4 We can get some bearings by comparing this with the top
1 percent of households in a survey of the United States, a nation with
even higher inequality, and where this group takes a larger share of the
national income (Keister 2014). We also examine patterns in the largest
general British representative panel sample survey, "Understanding Soci
ety" (USoc), which has a sample size of 40,000 (31,821 after accounting for
sampling weights) (University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic
Research and National Centre for Social Research. 2014, Knies 2014). In
the analysis below we compare ·those with top household incomes in the
GBCS and USoc with "others," where household income falls below £45k.
As GBCS data are non-equivalizable, we cannot place this level of house
hold income after taxes on the distribution of household incomes; we can
only approximate that it corresponds approximately to the bottom 75 per
cent of the non-equivalized household income distribution.5
Table 8.1 reports the demographic characteristics of those with highest
household incomes within the GBCS and "others." In line with the US data
from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) (Keister 2014), respondents
with highest household income after taxes are older on average than all
other income g�oups (though only slightly), and they are predominantly
male (67.1 percent).
Compared with the socio-demographic characteristics of the top 1 per
cent in the US in the representative Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
(Keister 2014), the GBCS respondents with household incomes larger than
£200k (Table 8.1) are younger, with an average age of 42 and more likely
to be female (33 percent). Keister finds tl1at the top 1 percent in terms
of income in the US are 98 percent male with an average age of 55. The
reason why GBCS respondents are more likely to be female is that the data
refers to household income and does not distinguish between main earn
ers and other members of the household. Atldnson et al. (2016) show that
in 2012 there are only 18 percent women in the top 1 percent in the UK
These findings point towards the importance of studies which "gender" the
elites (Glucksberg this volume) and account for gendered differences in
elite households.
In addition, GBCS respondents with top household incomes are also
slightly less likely to be white than all other individuals and slightly-i;nore
likely to be Asian/Asian British and Middle Eastern/Middle Eastern British
compared to "all others" (in contrast to Keister who finds that the top 1 per
cent in the nationally representative SCF are 91 percent white compared
to 69 percent of the bottom 90 percent of the distribution). They are also
more likely to be married, living with their partner, and having degree
level education compared with all others (Table 8.2). Other key differences
between individuals living in the highest-income households (£200k+)
and all other individuals is that the former are more than twice as likely
to work in a traditional professional occupation, and five times as likely to
be in a senior managerial position. In addition to w,orking in more advan
taged professions themselves, GBCS respondents with highest household

Table 8.1 GBCS respondents with high household income, the highest value prop, erty or high savings
Socio-demographic
characteristics
Male
Age
Ethnicity
White-British, Irish, other
Asian/Asian British
Rather not say
Other ethnic group
Chinese/Chinese British
Mixed race - other
Mixed race - v\'hite a.
Asian/Asian British
Middle Eastern/Middle
Black/Black British
Mixed race -v\'hite a.
Black/Black British
Married/living with partner
Having children
Education
Degree-level education
Postgraduate degree
Undergraduate degree
Occupation
Senior managerial
Traditional professional
Family background
(occupation)
Senior managerial
Traditional professional
GBCS elite class
Value of property >500k
Value of savings >200k
% of GBCS sample
Approximate % of the UK
income distribution
Number of individuals*

...
..

Household income after taxes
£200k+

£150199k

£100149k

67.1
42.0

60.3
41.7

88.8
3.0
2.6
1.4
1.0
1.0
0.6

90.1
3.4

£4599.9k

All
others

61.4
41.3

53.4
40.0

48.4
39.5

91.9
2.1
1.8
1.1
0.8
0.6
0.5

92.3
1.3
2.3

1.0
1.0
0.8
0.5

90.6
2.9
1.6
1.1
1.0
0.7
0.7

0.6
0.5
0.4

0.4
0.7
0.3

0.3
0.8
0.3

0.3
0.7
0.3

0.3
0.7
0.3

81.6
64.0

81.4
60.1

80.8
58.3

81.1
52.7

56.9
43.8

86.9
46.4
40.6

86.2
45.1
41.1

84.6
43.3
41.2

78.7
38.1
40.6

66.5
27.0
39.5

45.4
32.6

43.1
30.1

36.7
28.2

22.0
21.8

8.9
13.3

38.9
26.3
100.0
76.1
68.8
1.9
Top 1%

34.1
24.7
99.9
56.2
40.2
1.8

4,521

4,239

14.9
21.7
13.9
18.8
8.9
27.7
11.1
2.2
4.3
10.2
51.0
39.5
Other
Top
10-25% 75-90%
ll9,004
91,998
13,413

1.7

1.1

0.6
0.7
0.5

30.7
23.2
91.7
38.2
27.1
5.8

Note: All figures are percentages except age and number of individuals

*

**
**

Due to missing values there is a difference of 2 between the sample size of individuals
who have indicated their household income and those who indicated savings and property
value.
Aside from value of house.
Others are assigned to either the latent class established middle class, or technical middle
class.
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composition).4 We can get some bearings by comparing this with the top
1 percent of households in a survey of the United States, a nation with
even higher inequality, and where this group takes a larger share of the
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ety" (USoc), which has a sample size of 40,000 (31,821 after accounting for
sampling weights) (University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic
Research and National Centre for Social Research. 2014, Knies 2014). In
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GBCS and USoc with "others," where household income falls below £45k.
As GBCS data are non-equivalizable, we cannot place this level of house
hold income after taxes on the distribution of household incomes; we can
only approximate that it corresponds approximately to the bottom 75 per
cent of the non-equivalized household income distribution.5
Table 8.1 reports the demographic characteristics of those with highest
household incomes within the GBCS and "others." In line with the US data
from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) (Keister 2014), respondents
with highest household income after taxes are older on average than all
other income g�oups (though only slightly), and they are predominantly
male (67.1 percent).
Compared with the socio-demographic characteristics of the top 1 per
cent in the US in the representative Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
(Keister 2014), the GBCS respondents with household incomes larger than
£200k (Table 8.1) are younger, with an average age of 42 and more likely
to be female (33 percent). Keister finds tl1at the top 1 percent in terms
of income in the US are 98 percent male with an average age of 55. The
reason why GBCS respondents are more likely to be female is that the data
refers to household income and does not distinguish between main earn
ers and other members of the household. Atldnson et al. (2016) show that
in 2012 there are only 18 percent women in the top 1 percent in the UK
These findings point towards the importance of studies which "gender" the
elites (Glucksberg this volume) and account for gendered differences in
elite households.
In addition, GBCS respondents with top household incomes are also
slightly less likely to be white than all other individuals and slightly-i;nore
likely to be Asian/Asian British and Middle Eastern/Middle Eastern British
compared to "all others" (in contrast to Keister who finds that the top 1 per
cent in the nationally representative SCF are 91 percent white compared
to 69 percent of the bottom 90 percent of the distribution). They are also
more likely to be married, living with their partner, and having degree
level education compared with all others (Table 8.2). Other key differences
between individuals living in the highest-income households (£200k+)
and all other individuals is that the former are more than twice as likely
to work in a traditional professional occupation, and five times as likely to
be in a senior managerial position. In addition to w,orking in more advan
taged professions themselves, GBCS respondents with highest household

Table 8.1 GBCS respondents with high household income, the highest value prop, erty or high savings
Socio-demographic
characteristics
Male
Age
Ethnicity
White-British, Irish, other
Asian/Asian British
Rather not say
Other ethnic group
Chinese/Chinese British
Mixed race - other
Mixed race - v\'hite a.
Asian/Asian British
Middle Eastern/Middle
Black/Black British
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Black/Black British
Married/living with partner
Having children
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Degree-level education
Postgraduate degree
Undergraduate degree
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Senior managerial
Traditional professional
Family background
(occupation)
Senior managerial
Traditional professional
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Value of property >500k
Value of savings >200k
% of GBCS sample
Approximate % of the UK
income distribution
Number of individuals*

...
..

Household income after taxes
£200k+

£150199k

£100149k

67.1
42.0

60.3
41.7

88.8
3.0
2.6
1.4
1.0
1.0
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90.1
3.4

£4599.9k

All
others

61.4
41.3

53.4
40.0

48.4
39.5

91.9
2.1
1.8
1.1
0.8
0.6
0.5

92.3
1.3
2.3

1.0
1.0
0.8
0.5

90.6
2.9
1.6
1.1
1.0
0.7
0.7

0.6
0.5
0.4

0.4
0.7
0.3

0.3
0.8
0.3

0.3
0.7
0.3

0.3
0.7
0.3

81.6
64.0

81.4
60.1

80.8
58.3

81.1
52.7

56.9
43.8

86.9
46.4
40.6

86.2
45.1
41.1

84.6
43.3
41.2

78.7
38.1
40.6

66.5
27.0
39.5

45.4
32.6

43.1
30.1

36.7
28.2

22.0
21.8

8.9
13.3

38.9
26.3
100.0
76.1
68.8
1.9
Top 1%

34.1
24.7
99.9
56.2
40.2
1.8

4,521

4,239

14.9
21.7
13.9
18.8
8.9
27.7
11.1
2.2
4.3
10.2
51.0
39.5
Other
Top
10-25% 75-90%
ll9,004
91,998
13,413

1.7

1.1

0.6
0.7
0.5

30.7
23.2
91.7
38.2
27.1
5.8

Note: All figures are percentages except age and number of individuals

*

**
**

Due to missing values there is a difference of 2 between the sample size of individuals
who have indicated their household income and those who indicated savings and property
value.
Aside from value of house.
Others are assigned to either the latent class established middle class, or technical middle
class.
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Tab/,e 8.2 Understanding Society respondents with high household income
Socio-demographic
characteristic

Household income after taxes
£4599.9k

£200k+

£150199k

£100149k

51%
53.3

53%
53.9

50%
48.1

52%
46.4

47%
53.1

White
Mixed
Asian
Black
Other ethnic group

94%
1%
4%
1%
0%
85%

95%
0%
5%
0%
0%
92%

89%
1%
7%
2%
0%
83%,

91%
1%
5%
2%
0%
84%

93%
1%
3%
2%
0%
61%

Degree-level education
University higher degree
First degree or equivalent

63%
28%
35%

58%
31%
27%

57%
31%
26%

43%
20%
23%

21%
8%
13%

Large employers and
higher management
Higher professional
Lower management and
professional
Intermediate
Small employers
Lower supervisory
Semi-routine
Routine

8%

16%

13%

9%

3%

24%
30%

16%
28%

21%
33%

13%
37%

7%
26%

8%
20%
2%
5%
3%
130

9%
22%
1%
5%
3%
110

12%
14%
3%
5%
1%
457

12%
10%
6%
10%
4%
7,417

15%
11%
9%
19%
11%
23,708

Male
Age
Ethnicity

Married/living with
partner
Education

Oc;cupation (NS-SEC)

Number of individuals*

All
others

incomes are almost three times as likely to have a senior managerial back
ground, and twice as likely to have 3: traditional professional background
compared with all others.
However, they are actually more likely to be members of ethnic mino.rities
than the less well-off (the proportions of Asian British, "other ethnic," Chi
nese British, mixed race and Middle Eastern is slightly higher than GBCS
respondents earning under £100k). This offers only very slight evidence for
a certain kind of "opening up" amongst very high earners and support for
Peter York's diagnosis of the decline of the white British "Sloane Rangers. "6
The very high earners are also not different from other GBCS respondents
in terms of their likelihood of having obtained an undergraduate degree.
However, they are 72 percent more likely to have obtained a postgraduate
degree than others.
The most striking difference between those with the highest household
incomes and others is that the former are disproportionately more likely to

, �wn large amounts of wealth. Those with the highest household incomes
�re 34 times more likely to own property valued higher than £500k and
16 times more likely to have savings higher than £200k than are all oth
ers. There is a clear association between having high household income
and having high savings and/ or property value amongst GBCS respondents
(Table 8.1). For the US, Keister (2014) estimates from the SCF that the cor
relation between total household income and total household net worth
has been about 0.50 to 0.60 since 2001. This correlation is reasonably high.
The categorical GBCS data do not allow the computation of a correlation;
however, the data shows that of those respondents with household incomes
of at least £200k, 76.1 percent also own a property worth more than £500k,
and 67.8 percent have savings larger than £200k. In comparison, those on
the lower end of the high-income spectrum (household income between
£100-149k) are approximately half as likely to do so (38.2 and 27.1 percent
respectively). Hence, there is an economic gradient whereby those GBCS
respondents with highest incomes are also much more likely to own high
value properties and have high savings (Table 8.2) compared to those with
household incomes one or two brackets below them.
Table 8.1 shows that those with household incomes over £200k are more
privileged on a number of dimensions than those who are earning some
what less, even for those who are also very well paid. They are more likely
to come from senior managerial or traditional professional backgrounds,
work in senior managerial or professional occupations, and more likely to
have high house values and savings.
Let us consider whether these findings are consistent with those indi
cated by the largest British general-purpose survey, "Understanding Soci
ety" (USoc). USoc has 31,821 respondents7 but only 130 people for the
category £200k+. This in itself indicates the strength of the GBCS, and also
underscores how small the USoc sample is for granular analysis. This offers
further support to the numerous arguments that national sample surveys
do not contain a large enough number of elites and cannot be relied upon
for research on elites (Piketty 2014; Anand and Segal 2015;Jenkins 2016).
It is actually reassuring that there are similar trends in both datasets,
and the economic gradient in de facto marital status, degree-level educa
tion and occupation is apparent in both the GBCS and USoc data. Respon
dents to USoc with high household income are less likely to be male than
are those from the GBCS or the SCF (Table 8.3). USoc respondents with
highest household income are also more likely to be white than GBCS
respondents (94 compared to 89 percent), and, like the GBCS respon
dents, individuals from highest-income households (£100k and higher)
in USoc are predominantly white, but slightly more likely to be Asian/
Asi.an British than all other households. We cannot tell if ethnic minor
ity high-income respondents are overrepresented amongst GBCS. There
is a greater proportion than for USoc, but since there are only a small
number of non-white high earners in USoc we cannot infer any general
patterns.
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Tab/,e 8.2 Understanding Society respondents with high household income
Socio-demographic
characteristic

Household income after taxes
£4599.9k
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52%
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53.1
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85%

95%
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0%
0%
92%

89%
1%
7%
2%
0%
83%,

91%
1%
5%
2%
0%
84%

93%
1%
3%
2%
0%
61%

Degree-level education
University higher degree
First degree or equivalent

63%
28%
35%

58%
31%
27%

57%
31%
26%

43%
20%
23%

21%
8%
13%

Large employers and
higher management
Higher professional
Lower management and
professional
Intermediate
Small employers
Lower supervisory
Semi-routine
Routine

8%

16%

13%

9%

3%

24%
30%

16%
28%

21%
33%
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37%

7%
26%
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3%
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14%
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11%
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Ethnicity
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partner
Education

Oc;cupation (NS-SEC)

Number of individuals*
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others

incomes are almost three times as likely to have a senior managerial back
ground, and twice as likely to have 3: traditional professional background
compared with all others.
However, they are actually more likely to be members of ethnic mino.rities
than the less well-off (the proportions of Asian British, "other ethnic," Chi
nese British, mixed race and Middle Eastern is slightly higher than GBCS
respondents earning under £100k). This offers only very slight evidence for
a certain kind of "opening up" amongst very high earners and support for
Peter York's diagnosis of the decline of the white British "Sloane Rangers. "6
The very high earners are also not different from other GBCS respondents
in terms of their likelihood of having obtained an undergraduate degree.
However, they are 72 percent more likely to have obtained a postgraduate
degree than others.
The most striking difference between those with the highest household
incomes and others is that the former are disproportionately more likely to

, �wn large amounts of wealth. Those with the highest household incomes
�re 34 times more likely to own property valued higher than £500k and
16 times more likely to have savings higher than £200k than are all oth
ers. There is a clear association between having high household income
and having high savings and/ or property value amongst GBCS respondents
(Table 8.1). For the US, Keister (2014) estimates from the SCF that the cor
relation between total household income and total household net worth
has been about 0.50 to 0.60 since 2001. This correlation is reasonably high.
The categorical GBCS data do not allow the computation of a correlation;
however, the data shows that of those respondents with household incomes
of at least £200k, 76.1 percent also own a property worth more than £500k,
and 67.8 percent have savings larger than £200k. In comparison, those on
the lower end of the high-income spectrum (household income between
£100-149k) are approximately half as likely to do so (38.2 and 27.1 percent
respectively). Hence, there is an economic gradient whereby those GBCS
respondents with highest incomes are also much more likely to own high
value properties and have high savings (Table 8.2) compared to those with
household incomes one or two brackets below them.
Table 8.1 shows that those with household incomes over £200k are more
privileged on a number of dimensions than those who are earning some
what less, even for those who are also very well paid. They are more likely
to come from senior managerial or traditional professional backgrounds,
work in senior managerial or professional occupations, and more likely to
have high house values and savings.
Let us consider whether these findings are consistent with those indi
cated by the largest British general-purpose survey, "Understanding Soci
ety" (USoc). USoc has 31,821 respondents7 but only 130 people for the
category £200k+. This in itself indicates the strength of the GBCS, and also
underscores how small the USoc sample is for granular analysis. This offers
further support to the numerous arguments that national sample surveys
do not contain a large enough number of elites and cannot be relied upon
for research on elites (Piketty 2014; Anand and Segal 2015;Jenkins 2016).
It is actually reassuring that there are similar trends in both datasets,
and the economic gradient in de facto marital status, degree-level educa
tion and occupation is apparent in both the GBCS and USoc data. Respon
dents to USoc with high household income are less likely to be male than
are those from the GBCS or the SCF (Table 8.3). USoc respondents with
highest household income are also more likely to be white than GBCS
respondents (94 compared to 89 percent), and, like the GBCS respon
dents, individuals from highest-income households (£100k and higher)
in USoc are predominantly white, but slightly more likely to be Asian/
Asi.an British than all other households. We cannot tell if ethnic minor
ity high-income respondents are overrepresented amongst GBCS. There
is a greater proportion than for USoc, but since there are only a small
number of non-white high earners in USoc we cannot infer any general
patterns.
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Tab/,e 8.3 Cultural and social capital amongst high earners: GBCS
Household income after taxes

£200k +

£150199k

£100149k

£4599.9k

All

others

-GBCSMean
Household Income

Social network: knowing socially

An aristocrat
A finance manager
A solicitor
A postal worker

37.6
75.2
89.l
6.5

27.2
69.8
83.4
8.8

20.4
66.5
79.1
10.4

11.4
51.9
65.4
16.4

8.2
33.6
50.5
24.0

Go to the opera
Classical music concerts
Watch sport live
Play sport
Go to the theatre/musicals
Go to the gym
Go to restaurants

28.8
36.5
46.1
63.0
66.6
76.2
97.9

20.4
31.0
41.0
59.5
60.3
72.8
97.5

16.4
27.6 '
37.8
56.9
57.2
69.8
97.0

10.4
20.7
31.8
48.8
49.4
63.5
94.7

7.4
16.9
23.1
37.5
39.6
52.1
86.7

Cultural capital: do sometimes or often

N

Non-student respondents aged 22 plus in •
households earning £200,000 or more p.a.

,·

Greater London
.r.......... ___1
.....

...

_/,,..... ~

i ·,,.,--�-r

Note: All figures are percentages.

USoc respondents are generally less highly educated than those in the
GBCS (which we fully expect, given the well-known skew of the GBCS
towards the well-educated). The association between level ofeducation and
household income brackets is even stronger in the USoc data. Sixty-three
percent ofthose individuals with household income of£200k+ have degree
level education; only 21 percent ofall others do so.
We can therefore be reassured that the GBCS does not appear to be out
ofline in terms ofthe relationship it indicates between the attributes ofthe
highest-income earners and others beneath them, and we will therefore
now turn to examine what its data reveals about the wider social and cul
tural profiles ofthe very high earners. We start by considering their distinc
tive geography.
3 Spatial distribution of high-income earners

In Figure 8.1 every household with a GBCS non-student respondent aged
22 or over earning over £200k is marked with a black dot. Figure 8.1 shows,
predictably, a strong clustering in London with a weak corridor working
through the Midlands and into the North West of England - where Man
chester is the second-largest centre - and small pockets in Glasgow, Edin
burgh, Cardiff and Newcastle. W hereas the rural areas in the South East of
England have considerable numbers ofdots, large areas ofWales, Scotland,
the South West and North ofEngland are bare indeed.
Ifwe control by looking at the GBCS very high earners as a proportion
of the actual population in different areas (Figure 8.2), then the pattern

ltt1l11II
s,ale for VK Ml;-

Figure 8.1 GBCS Mean household income for non-student respondents aged 22
plus in households earning £200.000 or more p.a.
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USoc respondents are generally less highly educated than those in the
GBCS (which we fully expect, given the well-known skew of the GBCS
towards the well-educated). The association between level ofeducation and
household income brackets is even stronger in the USoc data. Sixty-three
percent ofthose individuals with household income of£200k+ have degree
level education; only 21 percent ofall others do so.
We can therefore be reassured that the GBCS does not appear to be out
ofline in terms ofthe relationship it indicates between the attributes ofthe
highest-income earners and others beneath them, and we will therefore
now turn to examine what its data reveals about the wider social and cul
tural profiles ofthe very high earners. We start by considering their distinc
tive geography.
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3 Spatial distribution of high-income earners

In Figure 8.1 every household with a GBCS non-student respondent aged
22 or over earning over £200k is marked with a black dot. Figure 8.1 shows,
predictably, a strong clustering in London with a weak corridor working
through the Midlands and into the North West of England - where Man
chester is the second-largest centre - and small pockets in Glasgow, Edin
burgh, Cardiff and Newcastle. W hereas the rural areas in the South East of
England have considerable numbers ofdots, large areas ofWales, Scotland,
the South West and North ofEngland are bare indeed.
Ifwe control by looking at the GBCS very high earners as a proportion
of the actual population in different areas (Figure 8.2), then the pattern

ltt1l11II
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Figure 8.1 GBCS Mean household income for non-student respondents aged 22
plus in households earning £200.000 or more p.a.
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is somewhat different. The highly unequal geography is even more
crisply displayed. There is a very clear "west London corridor" with its
epicentre in Camden, West.minste, Kensington and Chelsea, and which
then works along the Thames to Windsor (including the borough of
l lammersmit.h and Fulham, Wandsworth and Richmond upon Thames).
There are a few other areas in the Home Counties and in rural areas with
a significant overrepresentation, and a few more scattered areas with a
slight positive residual. But the overall geography is stark and clear: there
is a very strong overrcpresentation of very high-income earners in a very
specific: part of West London, and nowhere else. It is highly revealing that
cities other than London (e.g. Leeds, Sheffield, Manchester) have lower
than expected very high-income earners. This very distinctive geographi
cal location of very high earners is consistent with the idea that they may
very well be associated with forms of social and cultu ral exclusion, in that
their neighbourhoods arc distinctive and that they share a tendency to
live close together.
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Figure 8.2 GBCS mean household income. OLS modelling respondents in house
holds earning £200.000 or more p.a., controlling for GBCS response rate
and household universe.

Central to our research question is the extent to which very high income
is associated with distinctive social and cultural relationships. We have seen
above that Warde and Bennett (2008) claim that the British elite is not
highly exclusive, and here we will scrutinize whether very high earners dif
fer not only from the wider population, but also from those who are j11st
"very well-off." If so, we might identify them as "a class apart" and qualify the
argument.s of Warde and Bennett. We can also see if they have the kinds of
cultural and social attributes which might mark them as embodying older
"highbrow" upper-class culture.
Table 8.3 shows that those with very high household incomes are con
siderably different from those only moderately well-off along a number of
measures of social and cult11ral capital. There are some areas whe1·e these
differences are especially pronounced, notably knowing an aristocrat and
going to the opera (an activity which Warde and Bennett (2008) also note
is distinctively popular amongst the managerial elite they studied). The dis
paritjes fall somewhat in other areas (e.g. knowing a finance manager or
going to classical music concerts) but arc still readily apparent. Having said
this, we should note that only 38 percent. of those with very high household
incomes know an aristocrat and less than a third (29 percent) go t.o the
opera. We might also note that the very high earners arc also more pre
disposed towards going to the gym, watching live sport, and playing sport
than other groups: they seem to represent in exaggera1cd form the general
tastes of the well-off in British society.
We can pursue this further by considering in more detail the nature of
musical tastes amongst this top group where we can gather more refined
data (Table 8.4). This shows again that classical music is very distinctive - it
is considerably overrepresented amongst this group, with only half as many
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Central to our research question is the extent to which very high income
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above that Warde and Bennett (2008) claim that the British elite is not
highly exclusive, and here we will scrutinize whether very high earners dif
fer not only from the wider population, but also from those who are j11st
"very well-off." If so, we might identify them as "a class apart" and qualify the
argument.s of Warde and Bennett. We can also see if they have the kinds of
cultural and social attributes which might mark them as embodying older
"highbrow" upper-class culture.
Table 8.3 shows that those with very high household incomes are con
siderably different from those only moderately well-off along a number of
measures of social and cult11ral capital. There are some areas whe1·e these
differences are especially pronounced, notably knowing an aristocrat and
going to the opera (an activity which Warde and Bennett (2008) also note
is distinctively popular amongst the managerial elite they studied). The dis
paritjes fall somewhat in other areas (e.g. knowing a finance manager or
going to classical music concerts) but arc still readily apparent. Having said
this, we should note that only 38 percent. of those with very high household
incomes know an aristocrat and less than a third (29 percent) go t.o the
opera. We might also note that the very high earners arc also more pre
disposed towards going to the gym, watching live sport, and playing sport
than other groups: they seem to represent in exaggera1cd form the general
tastes of the well-off in British society.
We can pursue this further by considering in more detail the nature of
musical tastes amongst this top group where we can gather more refined
data (Table 8.4). This shows again that classical music is very distinctive - it
is considerably overrepresented amongst this group, with only half as many
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Tab/,e 8.4 Ratio of musical tastes of top earners (£200 k+) compared to the rest of
GBCS (all non-students, N = 266,492 )

Classical
Jazz
World
Pop
Dance
Country and western
Rap
Reggae
Rock
Folk
Heavy metal

Like a
lot ratio

Total
like ratio

Total
dislike ratio

Dislike
a wt ratio

1.65
1.34
1.13
1.06
1.01
0.98
0.92
0.86
0.78
0.71
0.57

1.36
1.19
1.10
1.05
1.01
0.94
0.95
0.92
0.88
0.78
0.67

0.51
0.76
1.05
0.95
0.98
1.12
1.03
1.15 '
1.29
1.28
1.22

0.50
0.76
1.12
1.00
0.98
1.20
1.06
1.25
1.37
1.37
1.31

Tab/,e 8.5 Attitudes of the high-income earners (percent)
Household income after taxes
£200k +

£150199k

£100149k

£4599.9k

All

others

Attitudes

Upward social mobility got (a
little) easier
Think they belong to a class

65.6

64.0

65.6

63.3

58.7

55.4

55.2

55.0

52.3

48.7

Upper class
Upper-middle class
Middle-middle class

5.9
53.6
31.4

1.7
39.4
43.0

0.9
29.3
48.0

0.3
11.7
42.8

0.2
4.7
27.0

affecting local area
affecting their city/ region
affectingBrit ain

55.6
37.2
28.6

55.8
35.0
25.4

54.5
35.4
25.6

50.4
32.5
22.8

41.3
27.5
19.3

Self-identify as belonging to

Feel can influence decisions ...

disliking it as amongst GBCS respondents as a whole. Jazz is also relatively
popular amongst those with highest household incomes.
In fact, comparison with the GBCS as a whole indicates that the very high
earners are not very different from the wider sample with regard to their
feelings about many genres, such as pop, dance and rap music. They stand
out only with respect to being keener on classical music andjazz, and dislik
ing rock, folk and heavy metal a good deal more than other groups. In short,
there is only par tial evidence that the very highly paid have a dis tinctive set
of musical tastes. Although there con tinues to be some overrepresentation

amongst more "highbrow" forms - notably around classica l music and the
opera - it is doubtful whether this is so strong as to indic ate that it is a
key formative culture for these groups. This substantiates the arguments of
Warde and Bennett (2008).
However, there is one area where the elite are very distinctive, that of cla ss
awareness. .Table 8.5 reveals that nearly 60 percent of the top £200k earn
ers see themselves as upper or upper-middle class, compared to 40 percent
of those earning between £150k and £199k, 30 percent of those earning
£100-149k, and just 12 percent of those earning £45-99k. This is a striking
gradient (considerably above the other attitudes which are asked about in
Table 8.5) and lends support to the arguments of Savage (2015b) that the
very rich do have a sense of their superior class position, and hence a form
of class identity.
5 Dissecting top earners: a multiple correspondence
analysis of high-income earners

Our argument so far indicates those with highest household incomes earn
ers are not especially culturally and socially distinctive, though they have
distinctive geographical preferences, and propensities to see themselves as
upper-middle class. These latter two issues might be a product of their dis
tinctive economic advantages, rather than specific cultural orienta tions. We
can take this issue further by conducting a multiple correspondence analysis
(MCA) of our very high earners and their partners.. This will allow us to
detect whether we can discern distinctive "highbrow" partitions within our
sample of high-earning households. Do the very high earners fall into distinc
tive clusters, or are they, by contrast, relatively homogeneous amongst them
selves? To what degree can distinct oppositions be found in this group? We
therefore construct a space of lifestyles amongst the GBCS super-rich sample.
Here, we have included 19 questions from the GBCS measuring a wide range
of leisure activities as the active set of variables. The MCA revealed three
dimensions to retain, which sum to 87.1 percent of the modified inertia:
Axis 4 can be interpreted, but is clearly more of a secondary axis. The
cloud of individuals (not shown) is well balanced, but there is a Guttman
Tab/,e 8. 6 Eigenvalues, modified eigenvalues and modified rates

Axis

Eigenvalue

Percentage

Modified
eigenvalue

Modified
inertia rate

Cum. modified
rate

Axis1
Axis2
Axis3
Axis 4
Axis5

0.1497
0.1160
0.0973
0.0837
0.0757

5.8
4.5
3.8
3.2
2.9

0.0101
0.0042
0.0022
0.0011
0.0006

53.1
22.3
11.7
5.8
3.1

53.1
75.4
87.1
92.9
96.0
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feelings about many genres, such as pop, dance and rap music. They stand
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gradient (considerably above the other attitudes which are asked about in
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Our argument so far indicates those with highest household incomes earn
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Figure 8.3 Categories with the highest contributions to Axis 1

Figure 8.4 Categories with the highest contributions to Axis 2

effect in Axes 1-3. Below,we therefore concentrate on Axes 1 and 2, with
lesser attention to Axis 4.
Compared to many other MCA of lifestyles, with 53.1 percent of the mod
ified inertia rate,the first axis is not particularly dominant. There is clearly
also more than one main opposition in the data.
Upon closer inspection,Axis 1 stands out as a typical "volume" axis,with
those doing few or no activities on the right, and those often doing the
listed activities on the left. The activities which are especially discriminat
ing are typically "legitimate" activities like going to the theatre, reading
books,visiting stately homes and museums and art galleries,bu.t also seeing
friends. These generally distinguish between those who are highly active
(exhibiting the voraciousness which Warde and Bennett (2008) see as char
acteristic of the managerial elite) and those who are less so.
Axis 2 discriminates between respondents who often participate in watch
ing and playing sport,going to the pub,and engaging in social networking.
At the bottom are those who never do these activities but often or some
times go to theatre, arts, museums and galleries and stately homes. This
partition is very similar to that which has been detected for the population

as a whole (Bennett et al. 2009) and indicates a distinction between "high
brow" (at the bottom) and "emerging" (at the top) cultural capital. This is a
finding of some interest in emphasizing that a fraction of very high earners
are also indifferent to "highbrow" culture.
Axis 4, the second-order axis (not shown), discriminates between those
who often engage in DIY and the arts - but do nothing else - and those who
watch and play sports,and go to the gym. Although it is analytically interest
ing, it summarizes only 5.8 percent of the modified inertia and we drop it
from further investigation.
Which factors appear to be associated with these oppositions (Figu re 8.5)?
As anticipated, age has the predicted effect on Axis 2. The major differen
tiation between emerging and "highbrow" cultura) capital differentiates on
the age axis,just as it does for the population as a whole. The younger high
earners are not clones of their elders, and share in a wider shift towards less
"highbrow" forms of cultural capital.
We can also see that educational attainment has a significant role in
separating individuals on the first axis, with arts and humanities graduates
considerably more on the engaged side of Axis I than engineers, scientists
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Figure 8.5 Passive modalities on Axis 1 and 2: age, subject of degree

and non-graduates. Returning to our original research questions, there
is therefore some scope to suggest that the traditional association of the
upper classes with anti-technological orientations only applies to specific
partitions within the very wealthy. Our analysis indicates that there appears
to be a more "technocratic" wing, which also tends to be younger.
This view is enhanced when we project occupational codes onto these
axes (Figure 8.6). The established professions, medicine and law are
associated with the engaged and "highbrow" lifestyles, whilst those 'who
work in the corporate sector and in finance tend towards "emerging cul
tural capital" at the top of the second axis. We see those few representa
tives of non-salariat occupations located on the disengaged side of Axis l.
In this respect, Axis 2 is also an axis that describes an opposition between
positions with high volumes of institutionalized cultural capital and the
positions with the very highest volumes of economic capital. Two forms
of power - professional power, generally regarded as a legitimate form of
power based on expert knowledge, and economic power, which is more
often contested with respect to legitimacy - are thus also contrasted
along the axis.

Figure 8.6 Passive modalities on Axis 1 and 2: occupation
We can generalize from this analysis as follows: high-income earners and
their partners are not a unitary grouping ( e.g. along the lines of a cohesive
financial or aristocratic class), and their social and cultural orientations
vary significantly between a more established and a more "emerging" kind.
Warde and Bennett's characterization of the managerial elite applies to the
more established group, but we should also be aware of a younger, more
technocratic fraction which is less attracted to traditional "highbrow" cul
tural forms.
Conclusion

Naturally, we need to be cautious. The micro-skews in the GBCS complicate
attempts to draw inferences. Nonetheless, we can address our original ques
tions - especially the extent to which there is an opposition between the
old British upper classes and the new, finance-driven elites - on the basis
of our elaborated analysis. We do, indeed, find some evidence of this kind
of opposition.
Firstly, although there are elements by which the super-high earners and
their partners are distinguished from other economic groups culturally and
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and non-graduates. Returning to our original research questions, there
is therefore some scope to suggest that the traditional association of the
upper classes with anti-technological orientations only applies to specific
partitions within the very wealthy. Our analysis indicates that there appears
to be a more "technocratic" wing, which also tends to be younger.
This view is enhanced when we project occupational codes onto these
axes (Figure 8.6). The established professions, medicine and law are
associated with the engaged and "highbrow" lifestyles, whilst those 'who
work in the corporate sector and in finance tend towards "emerging cul
tural capital" at the top of the second axis. We see those few representa
tives of non-salariat occupations located on the disengaged side of Axis l.
In this respect, Axis 2 is also an axis that describes an opposition between
positions with high volumes of institutionalized cultural capital and the
positions with the very highest volumes of economic capital. Two forms
of power - professional power, generally regarded as a legitimate form of
power based on expert knowledge, and economic power, which is more
often contested with respect to legitimacy - are thus also contrasted
along the axis.
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We can generalize from this analysis as follows: high-income earners and
their partners are not a unitary grouping ( e.g. along the lines of a cohesive
financial or aristocratic class), and their social and cultural orientations
vary significantly between a more established and a more "emerging" kind.
Warde and Bennett's characterization of the managerial elite applies to the
more established group, but we should also be aware of a younger, more
technocratic fraction which is less attracted to traditional "highbrow" cul
tural forms.
Conclusion

Naturally, we need to be cautious. The micro-skews in the GBCS complicate
attempts to draw inferences. Nonetheless, we can address our original ques
tions - especially the extent to which there is an opposition between the
old British upper classes and the new, finance-driven elites - on the basis
of our elaborated analysis. We do, indeed, find some evidence of this kind
of opposition.
Firstly, although there are elements by which the super-high earners and
their partners are distinguished from other economic groups culturally and

The anatomy of the British economic "elite" 171

170 · Mike Savage et al.
socially, these should not be overestimated. There is little evidence of dis
tinctive cultural patterns which would strongly distinguish the very high
earners from a wider group of middle-income households. The former are
slightly more likely to be attracted to "highbrow" culture, but this is far from
being overwhelming, and a substantial proportion report the same kind
of broadly omnivorous tastes which are characteristic of a broader mid
dle-class population. The economic elite are not like the old upper class,
marked out by their consumption and cultural preferences as a distinctive,
ascribed group, from the middle and lower ranks of society.
Secondly, amongst the high earners, we can detect a partition between
what we might call an "established" and "emerging" elite. Those who were
educated in the arts and humanities and work in established professions
tend towards a culturally engaged "highbrow" set of activities, whilst those
who work in finance and were more likely to be educated in science and
engineering report more "emerging" cultural interests and are more pre
disposed to eschew the "highbrow" forms. This distinction also maps onto a
differentiation between the older and younger high earners. To this extent,
we can detect some distinction between "old" and "new" money, which also
maps onto occupational and educational profiles. We might see this as
marking a subtle shift from older upper-class idioms towards newer finan
cialized and technocratic elements.
Our overall interpretation, therefore, is that the very high earners and
their partners are not a highly distinctive social and cultural group and
mainly present in extreme forms the tendencies of the relatively affluent
groups. They are, however, economically distinct given their vast amounts
of wealth. To this extent, we share Piketty's (2014) suggestion that we
should not fixate on the 1 percent as a class apart, but rather see them as
the extreme beneficiaries of wider trends towards accumulation which have
benefited a larger share of the population. This also supports the conten
tion of Savage (2015b} that in sociological terms "elites" should be con
strued as a rather wider category than the "one percent." Having made
this point, it is the very distinctive geography of this group, highly concen
trated on the Thames corridor, that does give a certain very clear profile to
extremely high earners and emphasizes how geographical dynamics may
play a fundamental role in crystallizing boundaries between social groups.

and national insurance deductions; others might have responded specifically on
their income minus taxation alone. However, this does not make a huge differ
ence: for a single-person household, if all deductions were taken off, this would
approximate to an employed salary of £390,000 (assuming an 8 percent pen
sion contribution), but if only taxation was deducted, the salary would still be
£350,000 - still placing the respondents easily in the top 0.5 percent of income
earners. (The top 0.1 percent earn an average of £919,000.)
4 According to national statistics from HM Revenue & Customs estimated from the
Survey of Personal Incomes, the 99th percentile point on the income distribution
or the threshold to the top 1 percent for an individual was £100k after tax in the
tax year 2011-2012. Similarly, Danny Dor ling (2014) estimates with reference to a
report by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, that to qualify to be a member of the top
1 percent in the UK, an income of approximately £115k a year from all income
sources after income tax is needed in 2011-2012 (or £147k before tax). Dorling
(2014) notes that "this estimate is for a childless couple. Should you be single, you
can enter the 1 per cent with a little less; should you have children, you'll need a
somewhat higher household income."
5 According to the DvVP Household Below Average Income (HBAI) statistics, which
use equivalized household income from all sources after tax (Jenkins 2016), £45k
is the cut-off point for the top decile in household income for 2011/2012 (£46k
in 2012/2013 (Department for Work and Pensions 2014)). However, the GBCS
data presented here is not equivalized; i.e. it does not account for differences in
household composition, meaning differences between the living standards of a
single person, a couple or a couple with children. As it is not possible to equival
ize GBCS participants' household income it is difficult to place their income on
the distribution of household incomes in the population. Hence, we compare
GBCS data to the non-equivalized household income of the nationally represent
ative USoc. Annual non-equivalized net household income of £45k represents
the income of the top quarter of the household income distribution in USoc.
Hence, "all others" refer to approximately the bottom 75 percent of the non
equivalized net household income distribution. Note that these individuals are
underrepresented in the GBCS, because they only make up 51 percent of the
sample (n = 120k).
6 It is possible that this reflects micro-skews within the GBCS towards very high
paid ethnic minorities being more likely to be respondents than those who are
moderately well paid, but this is unlikely. The ethnic bias seems to more generally
overrepresent the better off.
7 This figure accounts for the sample design (sampling probabilities).
8 Here we are plotting the number of high-income earner respondents from GBCS
against the population baselines in these geographical areas.
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